Political Reactionism as Affective Practice: UKIP Supporters and Non-Voters in Pre-Brexit England by Sullivan, Gavin Brent
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 260–273
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i3.4261
Article
Political Reactionism as Affective Practice: UKIP Supporters and
Non‐Voters in Pre‐Brexit England
Gavin Brent Sullivan 1,2
1 International Psychoanalytic University Berlin, Germany; E‐Mail: gavin.sullivan@ipu‐berlin.de
2 Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, UK; E‐Mail: ab7809@coventry.ac.uk
Submitted: 9 March 2021 | Accepted: 5 July 2021 | Published: 27 August 2021
Abstract
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) supporters and non‐voters in England participate respectively in forms of
engaged and disengaged anti‐political activity, but the role of individual, group‐based, and collective emotions is still
unclear. Drawing upon recent analyses of the complex emotional dynamics (e.g., ressentiment) underpinning the growth of
right‐wing populist political movements and support for parties such as UKIP, this analysis explores the affective features
of reactionary political stances. The framework of affective practices is used to show how resentful affects are created,
facilitated, and transformed in sharing or suppressing populist political views and practices; that is, populism is evident
not only in the prevalence and influence of illiberal and anti‐elite discourses but also should be explored as it is embodied
and enacted in “past focused” and “change resistant” everyday actions and in relation to opportunities that “sediment”
affect‐laden political positions and identities. Reflexive thematic analysis of data from qualitative interviews with UKIP
voters and non‐voters (who both supported leaving the EU) in 2015 after the UK election but before the EU referendum
vote showed that many participants: 1) shared “condensed” complaints about politics and enacted resentment towards
politicians who did not listen to them, 2) oriented towards shameful and purportedly shameless racism about migrants,
and 3) appeared to struggle with shame and humiliation attributed to the EU in a complex combination of transvaluation
of the UK and freedom of movement, a nostalgic need for restoration of national pride, and endorsement of leaving the
EU as a form of “change backwards.”
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1. Introduction
A widely accepted view of populism as a “thin ideol‐
ogy” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017) emphasises a central
distinction between “the people” and “the elite” which
does not map in a simple way onto established right
and left ideologies or a common political programme
(Taylor et al., 2020). In addition, there are significant
national and cultural variations in patterns of “populist
attitudes” measured at the individual level (Castanho
Silva et al., 2020) and self‐reported anti‐establishment
sentiment (Droste, 2021). Moreover, as Obradović et al.
(2020) note, right‐wing populist rhetoric is triggered by—
but not solely the product of—one’s economic stand‐
ing in society and, specifically, a felt sense of depriva‐
tion relative to others (Jay et al., 2019; Mols & Jetten,
2016; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017, 2018). Regarding
the 2016 EU referendum in the UK, therefore, for the
Leave campaign to succeed it needed to unite “both high‐
incomeand low‐incomeearners through conceptualising
the in‐group as amoral majority” (Obradović et al., 2020,
p. 126) against out‐group political elites and immigrants.
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In debates about populism, a focus on a reactionary
“complex political orientation” provides a new perspec‐
tive on such populist political behaviour as support‐
ing the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) or
voting for Brexit, because it highlights a critical moti‐
vational role for “resentful affectivity [combined] with
the forceful desire to return to the past” (Capelos &
Katsanidou, 2018, p. 1272). Not to be confused with sim‐
ple group‐based nostalgia (Smeekes, 2019; Wohl et al.,
2020), reactionism appeals to “an idealized past and
social order and the desire for restoration of the past
marks the broadly similar narratives of contemporary
‘radical’ populist, neo‐Nazi, and ethno‐nationalist politi‐
cal parties” such as the National Front in France (Capelos
& Katsanidou, 2018, p. 1284). UKIP was able to attract
voters from both the left (e.g., traditional Labour sup‐
porters) and the right of UK politics to support a core bun‐
dle of anti‐establishment, anti‐immigration, and anti‐EU
messages (Hughes, 2019). Before the referendum, for
example, the Leave campaign repeatedly used the mes‐
sage “Take back control” as part of a reactionary “depic‐
tion of a stalled present and a future that is compro‐
mised by the unstoppable changes imposed by elites
on the country against its will” (Capelos & Katsanidou,
2018, p. 1284).
This article addresses the contribution of reactionary
orientations to understanding support for populist par‐
ties, movements, and views via recent accounts that
focus not just on anger, fear, resentment, and their
potential combinations with a lack of efficacy, but also
on the complex emotional phenomenon of ressenti‐
ment. As exemplified by Salmela and Capelos (2021), the
ressentiment driving reactionary political behaviour is
not a complex combination of low levels of hope and
low political efficacy with high levels of anxiety or anger
(Capelos & Demertzis, 2018), but rather an emotional
mechanism with two parallel transvaluation processes.
These processes transform “what was once desired or
valued yet unattainable into something reassessed as
undesirable and rotten, and one’s own self from infe‐
rior, a loser, to being noble and superior” (Salmela
& Capelos, 2021, p. 191). The article also explores
whether these phenomena can be found in England
among non‐voters and populist party supporters, groups
that Kemmers et al. (2016) argue are exemplars of an
“anti‐establishment career” from “democracy’s deviants”
(Kemmers et al., 2016, p. 757) in their research con‐
ducted in the Netherlands.
In the following sections, the conceptualization of
ressentiment as underpinning a reactionary orientation
towards politically significant stances associated with
populism is briefly reviewed, before the most recent
account of ressentiment as an emotional mechanism is
examined. A case is then made for understanding reac‐
tionary orientations not in terms of personality features
or traits, and causal mechanisms, but instead within an
affective practices framework (Wetherell, 2012). In this
approach, patterns and flows of affectivity are examined
using an alternative ontological focus on meaning, activ‐
ity, and agency. The research questions are stated explic‐
itly in the final introductory section.
2. Emotion‐Focused Explanations of Reactionary
‘Anti‐Preferences’ and Populist Support
Presenting an emotion‐focused analysis of the EU ref‐
erendum, Cromby (2019) has argued that explanations
of Brexit have largely been framed in terms of the
“feeling‐organising myth” in which Brexit represents the
anger and apathy of those left behind in Britain by mar‐
ket forces and globalisation (McKenzie, 2017a, 2017b).
On this account, feelings of “anger, resentment, discon‐
tent, and hope, of feeling left behind or left out” (Cromby,
2019, p. 59) reflected the reality of growing inequal‐
ity in the UK and contributed to a concomitant irra‐
tional diversion of “feelings of resentment from pow‐
erful elites” (Cromby, 2019, p. 59) towards immigrants.
Cromby’s analysis is broadly consistent with other expla‐
nations which favour a reactionist‐like account of the
demand‐side of populism or backlash politics (Busher
et al., 2018) and feature a complex blend of individual
and group‐based anger, fear, hope, loss, nostalgia, and
pride. Capelos and Demertzis (2018), for example, argue
that ressentimentful affectivity is characterised by low
levels of hope and efficacy, but high levels of anxiety
or anger; and that this specific cluster of affectivity is a
“compensatory emotion of the powerless that expedites
transvalution so that the person can stand and handle his
or her frustrations” (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018, p. 412).
The possibility of transvaluation (rather than a mere
diversion by elites of resentment) here is important as
suggested by the focus of Salmela and Capelos (2021)
on two parallel processes, as it may explain some of the
complex and often contradictory ways in which groups
such as non‐voters and UKIP supporters seem to simul‐
taneously desire and devalue possibilities (such as of
being listened to by politicians; a point that is explored
by Celis et al., 2021, in terms of “democratic dilem‐
mas”). But in the accounts introduced above, shame is
not identified as a driver of support for UKIP and Brexit.
Salmela and von Scheve (2017, 2018) have focused on
repression of personal shame and group identity dis‐
tancing as key emotional mechanisms that underpin
a reactionary political orientation. In Salmela and von
Scheve’s (2017) theoretical analysis, repression of eco‐
nomic shame about actual or anticipated loss of status is
posited to transform the emotion into anger and resent‐
ment against a range of perceived threats to, or enemies
of, oneself and one’s groups (e.g., family, community,
nation). Distancing from social identities that generate
shame or humiliation combines withmovement towards
identities and attitudes that offer a more exclusionary,
and potentially contemptuous and arrogant, group pride
(Sullivan & Day, 2019). This combination of societal and
cultural positioning along with personal and commu‐
nal experiences motivates a strong interest in anything
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that can turn things back to the way they were and
fuels the expression of highly critical views of the cur‐
rent status quo. Further, Salmela and von Scheve (2018)
speculate that a crucial distinction between reactionary‐
orientated populists on the right and left of politics, is
that the former are not open to discussing sources of
individual or group‐based shame. This is where the dou‐
ble transvaluation possibility described by Salmela and
Capelos (2021) offers a further insight worthy of rigor‐
ous empirical investigation: The ressentimentful individ‐
ual seeks the recognition of others for the new self or
social identity (which replaces the repressed shameful
identity) through sharing of group‐based emotions but
also they “defensively suspect their peers of being decep‐
tive” (Salmela & Capelos, 2021, p. 200).
3. Rationale for Studying Reactionary Orientations as
Affective Practice
Wetherell’s (2012) affective practices approach system‐
atically combines affect theory and emotion science in
a way that works through the conceptual excesses of the
latter and themeasurement (i.e., operationalisation) lim‐
itations and experimental focus of the former. It incorpo‐
rates insights from forms of emotion discourse research
(e.g., “extreme case formulations”; Edwards, 1999) that
emphasised what emotion words and statements “do”
in everyday accounts but failed to examine their embod‐
ied features and practices. Citing examples from inter‐
net comments boards about politicians such as “If any
MP had balls, they’d have paid for things out of their
own pocket like y’know… ordinary people” (Wetherell,
2012, p. 72), Wetherell shows how the analysis of such
postings is “a nice reminder of the flavour of ordinary
affective meaning‐making in one of its discursive public
forms” (2012, p. 72). But it is the potential of a further
“example of an affective practice of ‘righteous indigna‐
tion’” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 72) that guides the research
described below. Wetherell states that within melan‐
cholic communities, “rhetoric and narratives of unfair‐
ness, loss and infringement create and intensify the emo‐
tion. Bile rises and this then reinforces the rhetorical and
narrative trajectory. It goes round and round” (Wetherell,
2012, p. 7). This brief analysis fits with the view that a
reactionary orientation is not a defining, life‐long person‐
ality trait; instead, it is a context‐sensitive and practice‐
based “way of relating to the political world… strength‐
ened, moderated, and superceded based on how citi‐
zens interact with their political environment” (Capelos
& Katsanidou, 2018, p. 1275; see also Billig’s, 1978, 2014,
analyses of fascism).
Accordingly, the aim for the current study is to inves‐
tigate patterns of affective practice and related reac‐
tionary “felt utterances” (Wetherell, 2012) which are
mentioned in or can be inferred from the practices
and situations in which those affects are tried out,
rehearsed, debated, regulated, shared and “sedimented”
in longer term habitual and unreflective behaviour.
This approach highlights long‐term emotion‐related pro‐
cesses that explain a “build up” of resentment and bile,
as well as theway victimhood can be experienced as righ‐
teous. But also Wetherell (2012) points out the concep‐
tual problems that attend traditional dynamic psychoan‐
alytic accounts and the way they draw “attention away
from the organization and normative logics of the unfold‐
ing situated episode, context, interaction, relation and
practice and on to a hidden, determining, individual, psy‐
chic logic instead” (Wetherell, 2012, pp. 133–134; see
also Salmela & Capelos, 2021). Her use of Billig’s (1999)
rethinking of repression is a useful reminder to focus
research instead on the patterning of “actual everyday
social relations” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 136) and investigat‐
ing practices such as changing the topic and choosing to
elaborate some views and neglect others. For UKIP sup‐
porters and non‐voters this means exploring their stories
and efforts to alter and change emotions that are per‐
sonal or based on family or group identities as well as
to examine how they recall, imagine, or anticipate occa‐
sions inwhich their experiences and emotions are shared
and collective (Sullivan & Day, 2019). Close investigation
of manifestations of and talk about group‐based emo‐
tions such as shame and pride in everyday life may there‐
fore reveal important distributions of affective practices
in social formations (Wetherell, 2012).
4. Research Questions
The study research questions were: 1) Do non‐voters and
UKIP supporters demonstrate resentment and ressen‐
timentful affectivity in accounting for their combined
anti‐political stances?, 2) Can posited emotional mech‐
anisms and repression of shame be inferred from peo‐
ple’s research conversations and accounts of their prac‐
tices?, and 3) What distinct patterns of embodied
and situated affect‐laden and emotion‐related activity—
including “change backwards” (Capelos & Katsanidou,
2018) affective practices—are evident in the interviews
of non‐voters and UKIP supporters?
5. Method
5.1. Research Context
In 2015, there were approximately 37million eligible reg‐
istered voters in England (Office for National Statistics,
2019) out of a possible UK total of 46million voters (Gani,
2015). In the UK general election of that year, the reg‐
istered voter turnout was 66.1% in England, which con‐
firmed “a long‐term decline in the willingness of voters
to make it to the polling station” (Cowley & Kavanagh,
2016, p. 416). Non‐participation of people who are eli‐
gible to vote in national elections is a source of con‐
cern to parliamentary democracies because it indicates
growing discontent with and disengagement from politi‐
cal processes. Another concern amongst established par‐
ties was the growth of the UKIP from a fringe, radical
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right‐wing party in the 1990s (Ford & Goodwin, 2014)
to the party with the third highest number of votes—
12.6% or nearly 4 million across the UK—in 2015 (but
only one parliamentary seat). As Ford and Goodwin
(2014) explain, UKIP profited from a decade of grow‐
ing anti‐European Union sentiment and from adopting
a strategy that fused nativism and anti‐Europe, anti‐
EU, and anti‐immigration stances with radical right‐wing
mistrust of elites. In affective terms, UKIP was able to
organise “contrasting emotional feelings…hope for the
future and nostalgia for the past, feelings it associated
with notions of patriotism, tradition, and ‘Britishness’”
(Cromby, 2019, p. 60). Given that non‐voters were likely
to be disengaged, mistrustful of the two main parties
and attracted by a combination of hope and nostalgia‐
infused anti‐political emotions that eventually became
prominent in the EU referendum Leave campaign, com‐
bining this group with UKIP supporters arguably repre‐
sented citizens of England with reactionary political ori‐
entations. These two groups represent supporters of
“anti‐preferences” such as anti‐immigration and anti‐EU
preferences that Capelos and Katsanidou (2018) argue
co‐occur when they are more strongly related to prox‐
ies for reactionism; namely, a respect for tradition and
an “aversion towards openness to change” (p. 1278; see
also Celis et al.’s, 2021, analysis of focus groups with
target groups such as Yellow Vest protestors who are
likely to experience resentful affect). Goodwin (2015)
noted that after the 2015 election, UKIP’s “continued
prominence in British politics rests not only on the out‐
come of the forthcoming referendum on Britain’s EU
membership but also the salience of immigration, which
since the general election has risen to record levels”
(Goodwin, 2015, p. 15). At that time, he also pointed
out that of the 10 to 15% of the population who sup‐
port UKIP’s twin opposition to the EU and immigration:
“This is likely to fuel support for the ‘Leave’ camp at
the referendum, although it may not be enough to carry
the Eurosceptics over the line” (Goodwin, 2015, p. 15).
Subsequent analysis of the EU referendum result indi‐
cated that mobilising non‐voters was decisive in win‐
ning a small majority for Leave. The participants in this
study should therefore provide insights into why some
non‐voters eventually contributed to the 72.6% turnout
for the 2016 EU referendum, a level of voting participa‐
tion “higher than any UK general election since 1992”
(Dempsey & Johnston, 2018, p. 10).
5.2. Participants, Recruitment, and Interviewing
Ethical approval for the study was provided by the Ethics
Committee of the Centre for Research on Psychology,
Behaviour and Achievement, Coventry University.
Participants were recruited for qualitative interviews
on the basis of prior participation in a pre‐ and post‐
election Qualtrics survey of 1400 citizens of England eli‐
gible to vote in the 2015 election, distributed online
by a market research company in the week before and
the month following the election date of May 7th 2015.
Demographic information and participant details includ‐
ing national identity and ethnic identity items informed
by previous electoral research (Wyn Jones et al., 2013),
are described in Table 1. Participants who did not vote
in the election and participants who had voted for UKIP
were selected from the whole sample, and people from
both groups who gave permission to be contacted were
invited to take part in an interview. This resulted in a
study sample of 10 non‐voters (9 female, 8 male, age
range 22–75 years, average age 39.3 years) and 19 UKIP
voters (10 female, 9 male, age range 23–84 years, aver‐
age age 50.8 years). Interviews were conducted by tele‐
phone by the lead author and four research assistants
(see Acknowledgements) in June 2015. The interviews
took between 20 minutes and 50 minutes (with partici‐
pants reimbursed at a fixed amount higher than the min‐
imumwage). The same interview schedule was followed
by all interviewers, but they were also able to ask follow‐
up questions to elicit more detail about the situated
circumstances in which people “do and feel” politics in
their daily lives. Interviews were recorded as digital files
for subsequent deidentified verbatim transcription.
5.3. Analytic Strategy and Reflexivity
A critical realist case study framework was adopted in
which interviewswere used to identify and infer patterns
of affectivity in the situated circumstances of individuals
(Sullivan, 2018). The study was concerned with emotion‐
laden or oriented forms of intertwined discourse and
embodied action that can potentially become habitual or
“sedimented” over time (Wetherell, 2012). The affective
practices theoretical framework which has been used
for emotion‐focused fieldwork (e.g., exploring experi‐
ences in relation to national days; see Wetherell et al.,
2020) was combined with in‐depth qualitative interview‐
ing and a reflexive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke,
2020). Given the contentious nature of someof the politi‐
cal issues discussed, phone interviews provided freedom
and anonymity from the demands of face‐to‐face con‐
versation. While people’s facial expressions and gestures
could not be analysed, the distance of a telephone inter‐
view and the adoption of a naïve, interested, and gen‐
tle exploratory stance by the interviewers may have con‐
tributed towards the candidness of some interviewees’
conversation (e.g., some participants expressed thanks
for being listened to and others even described the inter‐
views as “therapeutic”). The interviewers were attuned
to the possibility that individuals who were being inter‐
viewed as potential reactionaries on the right of politics
might experience personal and group‐based shame in
relation to their circumstances and to being interviewed
by political “experts.” Reflexivity concerns focused also
on how people with reactionary orientations were iden‐
tified and whether the theoretical and practical basis for
this designation could feed back into the pathologisation
of people who opposemainstream politics. It was crucial
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Table 1. Interview participant information.
Pseudonyms NM1 NF1 NF2 NM2 NM3 NM4 NF3 NF4 NM5 NF5 UF1 UF2 UM1 UM2
Age 20 22 42 75 27 21 35 47 55 49 68 84 36 70
Gender Male Female Female Male Male Male Female Female Male Female Female Female Male Male
Location Bedfordshire Greater Norfolk Somerset Worcester‐ Greater Greater Nottingham‐ Essex Greater Wiltshire Wiltshire Greater East
by county Manchester shire London London shire London Manchester Midlands
National British British British English British British British English British British British English British British
identification and and and and and and and and
English English English English English English English English
Ethnic English British English English British Pakistani British English English English English English British British
Identity and and and and
English English English English
Previous No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
voter
EU Ref Yes Unsure No Yes No No No Yes Yes No Unsure Yes Yes Yes
participation
Intended EU Leave Unsure Leave Unsure Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Unsure Leave Leave Leave Leave
Ref vote
Note: NF = non‐voter female, NM = non‐voter male, UF = UKIP voter female, UM = UKIP voter male.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 260–273 264
Table 1. (Cont.) Interview participant information.
Pseudonyms UF3 UF4 UF5 UF6 UF7 UM3 UM4 UM5 UF8 UM6 UM7 UM8 UF9 UM9 UF10
Age 65 50 59 23 50 66 70 54 47 67 66 25 23 62 48
Gender Female Female Female Female Female Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Female Male Female
Location South Greater Norfolk Lincolnshire Dorset Cambridge‐ Oxford‐ Cheshire Greater Hampshire Mersey‐ Lancashire Norfolk Kent Greater
by county Yorkshire Manchester shire shire Manchester side London
National English British English English English British English British British British British British British English English
identification and and and
English English English
Ethnic English English English English English British English English British English British British British English English
Identity and and
English English
Previous Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
voter
EU Ref Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
participation
Intended EU Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave
Ref vote
Note: NF = non‐voter female, NM = non‐voter male, UF = UKIP voter female, UM = UKIP voter male.
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to look for examples that disconfirmed themes and to
report the results in accordance with criteria for good
quality qualitative research (Levitt et al., 2018).
6. Results and Discussion
Consistent with the account of a reactionary orienta‐
tion, and analogous to Billig’s (1978, 2014) criticisms
of authoritarian personality trait explanations of sup‐
porters of fascism, participants in this study combined
subjective positions with enactments and embodiments
of personal and social identities which often resonated
with the circumstances of their communities. As out‐
lined below, the themes identified in the combined post‐
2015 election interviews were: 1) sharing “condensed”
complaints and expanding upon grievances about poli‐
tics, including distrust, and enacting resentment about
not being listened to (for in‐depth examples, see Celis
et al., 2021); 2) orienting towards shameful and pur‐
ported shameless racism related to the new “righteous
victim” identity; and 3) transvaluation, nostalgia, and
change backwards. The latter two themes are presented
with exemplars and interpreted in terms of multiple—
often competing—fragmented frameworks and explana‐
tory accounts, including critiques of explanations focus‐
ing on emotional contagion, pathologisation of the work‐
ing class, and the role of collective nostalgia in support
for populist ideas.
6.1. Immigration Shame, Shamelessness,
and Ressentiment
As indicated in Table 1, both non‐voters and UKIP sup‐
porters had overlapping anti‐political stances and were
broadly in agreement that the UK should leave the
European Union. Given that many non‐voters expressed
a dislike for all political parties and elites because they
did not listen to them and did not care about them, there
were points of commonality with UKIP voters in terms of
how they accounted for their opposition tomigrants and
freemovement within the European Union. For example,
one male non‐voter noted:
NM5: I’ll vote because I think that Europe is part of
the problem, we give them all that money and for
what but I don’t agree with UKIP and those lot they
stand and then don’t go, what’s the point in that we
don’t vote for people to do nothing, they are just the
same as the Euro bureaucrats taking the money and
doing nothing aren’t they?
NM2 focused on problems with all the political party
leaders, and stated the main problem was that “I’m not
given a reasonable choice of people to vote for. I don’t
wantMilliband, I don’twant Cameron, I don’twant Clegg,
I don’t want Farage.” What many participants agreed
on, however, was the liberating and empowering anti‐
immigration and anti‐EU message promoted by Farage
and UKIP: “He speaks the truth. He speaks a lot of what
people think, I think, but are too scared to say. I think he
sticks up for a lot of people and what they’re too scared
to say out in public” (UF9).
With UKIP supporters, immigration consistently
evoked the shame connected with racism. Initially some
participants passed over the topic, as in the following
conversation:
NM1: Erm I think the younger I was themore positive
I was about politics, keen, fresh.
I: And now?
NM1: Probably just disillusioned with it, it’s not mak‐
ing a lot of difference to England with all these
immigrants.
For non‐voters and UKIP supporters who were
Eurosceptics mostly, but not exclusively, because they
were opposed to immigration, a key challenge was
how to orient towards potentially shameful charges of
racism connected with the populist party that supported
a “new social self”; namely, that UKIP were known
for “talking against immigration, they are taken to be
racist’’ (UM3). Where it was the explicit subject of con‐
versation in the research interviews, racism was often
oriented towards as a serious issue potentially laden
with shameful thoughts and feelings. A wide range of dis‐
cursive strategies was evident in the interviews including
defensive denial at the suggestion of group‐based shame
connected with supporting UKIP (e.g., “Absolutely not.
I haven’t got a racist bone in my body,” UM2) through to
acknowledgement that UKIP contained some extremists
and racists.
One participant summedup the kind of affective prac‐
tices that made it difficult for many people to say openly
that restricting immigration was UKIP’s primary appeal:
UF10: I know a lot of people say it’s politically incor‐
rect to say it, and again this is… social err sort of train‐
ing almost, over the years. We’re all kind of… I’m not
and neither are any of UKIP racist, it not a racist thing,
because you are led to be believe you are a horrible
person if you think “well actually, you know, we’re
buckling at the seams.”
Participant UF1 argued that she wanted to have:
A points system like Australia, you know, I mean we
must have people here who are going to contribute
and make our country richer in every way… It’s not
you know sort of just banning all foreigners [laughs]
you know, I’m not xenophobic, but erm ah now did
your questionnaire talk about xenophobia.
The hesitation here suggests the kind of psychic disrup‐
tion that has been identified previously as a plausible
marker of shame in conversation (Probyn, 2005).
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It was particularly evident in the conversations with
UKIP voters that many oriented towards shameful fea‐
tures of support for UKIP through denying they were
racist or xenophobic and normalising racist individuals
within the party (i.e., such exceptions were argued to
be present in all parties). Some non‐voters seemed to
feel that their lack of knowledge of political matters
somehow marked them out as lesser citizens; this was
noted frequently when discussing the elites and experts
they resented. Analogously, UKIP supporters appeared
to demonstrate that the charge of racism was another
way in which they were made by elites to feel bad
about their already difficult individual or collective cir‐
cumstances. In response to the question, “Do you think
politicians understand what is happening in your area?,”
NM3 provided an example that can be identified as dis‐
criminatory and expressing prejudice towards Eastern
Europeans but also revealed resentment that politicians
don’t face these challenges: “No, like all the Poles com‐
ing in, well it’s not just the Poles any more is it, it’s all
eastern Europeans, nobody does anything to stop it.”
The unnamed “nobody” here was explicitly identified in
other interviews as politicians.
NM3 demonstrated how the ordinary experiences of
two groups many of the participants disliked, Eastern
European migrants and people of a Muslim faith, were
presented as challenging and changing aspects of immi‐
gration that politicians did not have to deal with: “They
are removed yeah, they don’t have foreigners running
all over their area, 70 different languages in their kids’
school, not singing carols in case you upset the Muslim
kids, halal meat everywhere, what’s that for anyway
halal?” Combining these accounts indicates an affective‐
discourse repertoire that can be drawn upon when dis‐
cussing the state of the country and which shows that
both UK political elites and Europeans can be described
as unconcerned and even happy about the migration of,
for example, Eastern Europeans to the UK (i.e., imply‐
ing not only that a range of others do nothing about
their concerns but also that some others actively want
this to happen). In the example above, NM3 conformed
with an explanation of ressentiment in which there is
an affective dilemma of anger (potentially motivating
action) and powerlessness to do anything about this that
has become habitual or sedimented over a long time.
In contrast to accounts focusing on economic shame
outlined by Salmela and von Scheve (2017), supporters
of right‐wing reactionist stances would be expected to
react with anger to defend their illiberal political views
or cover a sense of shame or failure for holding them.
They would also be expected to respond this way to
feelings of not being listened to and of being deval‐
ued by politicians (i.e., in comparison to migrants, who
were often described by right‐wing reactionists as “jump‐
ing the queue” and competing for limited resources).
This study supported such explanatory accounts but also
found that some participants advocated more openly
aggressive and extreme views that might have been
the product of the repression of individual economic
and racism‐related shame (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017).
For example, NM4 said he talked about political issues
mainly with his mates, raising the issue of asylum seek‐
ers in France, who were “trying to come over, that’s not
right and nobody is doing anything, the French just want
to get them on trains over here, get rid of them like.”
UF7 reported social media discussions about “filling in
the channel tunnel” to prevent refugees walking through
it: “These so‐called refugees are completely false and
they should get lost,” adding that “they’re not refugees,
they’re economic migrants.” Instead of trying to under‐
stand their aims in coming to the UK and any poten‐
tial for them to contribute positively, she dismissed this
group as only aiming to “come into this country and try
to ruin it.”
For one participant, being in public spaces in
the presence of people not speaking English was
deeply uncomfortable, raising further concerns and
grievances that were ultimately connected with a loss of
national identity:
UF9: I was only shopping today and there was, I think
they might have been Polish but they were speak‐
ing foreign, looking at you funny but you don’t know
what they’re talking about. They could be talking
about you, I don’t feel comfortable, I feel like I’m in
a foreign country, I’m not in Britain, I’m not in an
English place, I feel like I’m in Poland somewhere, I’m
not in the UK when I’m out and about.
Such accounts were related to a sense of loss that
included the threat of a loss of identity and being pushed
out by others, and it was usually accompanied with a
familiar lament that it was shameful that politicians did
not do anything about this. Instead of blaming others,
however, several participants noted the loss of an imag‐
ined positive national community that appeared to pre‐
figure the theme of transvaluation that is examined in
Section 6.2: “We seem to have lost the knack of coping
now” (UF2).
In this context, an alternative conceptualization of
repression is helpful; namely, that shame is not uncon‐
scious but rather occurs as everyday interaction “repro‐
duces immoral temptations, which are routinely resisted
and repressed” (Billig, 1997, p. 140). The interviews
allowed for some participants to say things which usu‐
ally remain unspoken, except when sharing with like‐
minded others. Long‐held racist and xenophobic views
were usually rejected in favour of a positive in‐group
account that did not fully address the ambivalence that
often comes with persistent prejudice (e.g., combina‐
tions of feelings of warmth and unspoken or repressed
negative judgements of others as less competent, that
make racial prejudice resistant to change; seeDixon et al.,
2012). In place of acknowledgement of racism “in us,”
many participants reiterated the consequences of uncon‐
trolled immigration:
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UM2: And the NHS is crumbling, schools can’t cope,
housing is in a terrible state because we haven’t got
enough, because there are millions and millions of
people coming into the country. It’s not racist to
say stop.
Here evaluating grievances about immigration through
the lens of prejudice feeds into a sense of resentment
and powerlessness to be able to say something. The lack
of open discussion has arguably resulted in a desire for
leaders who will speak openly on such issues, a form of
empowerment that shares shame and alleviates any guilt
about the consequences of widespread restrictive or
punitive control of “immigrants” (including asylum seek‐
ers, refugees and other migrants). UKIP, for example, cre‐
ated opportunities for a kind of liberation from repressed
economic shame, older shame‐attracting identities (e.g.,
some occupational identities as discussed by Salmela &
von Scheve, 2017). However, being against Europeans
and the EU did not appear to create a sustainable “noble
and superior” social self (Salmela & Capelos, 2021).
Participants’ emotion‐laden references to many peo‐
ple sharing these views provide a kind of cover against
the individualising effect of the charge of shameful
racism associated with anti‐immigration stances. It is
telling that when evaluating claims about good and bad
immigrants, one participant stated:
So it’s really difficult to find your way through the
mire, you welcome the people who are prepared to
work and abide by our rules, it’s not that hard for
god’s sake, but we ought to be able to say no to peo‐
ple we don’t want.” (UF4)
Ultimately, therefore, racism was re‐presented as an
issue of being able to decide as a group who is accept‐
able while also avoiding as much of the “mire” attached
to debates about immigration. Mixed feelings about sup‐
portingUKIP—and a sense of a defensive suspicion about
one’s populist peers (see Salmela & Capelos, 2021)—was
indicated by a participant who was voting for them on a
single issue of opposing the HS2 railway:
UF4: You know discussing membership or not of the
EU, is more palatable than discussing curbs on immi‐
gration but I have a feeling that the majority of sup‐
porters of UKIP are probably in it from the immigra‐
tion point of view which I think is a bit of a shame as
it gives is somewhat a negative image and it makes
you perhaps feel a little awk‐embarrassed to asso‐
ciate yourself with it.
Thus, even with her limited connection to UKIP, for this
participant there was a strong sense of being associated
with a group which struggled to avoid the shame of a
morally indefensible position on immigration.
Further examples showed how willing some partici‐
pantswere to express deeply ambivalent, affective dilem‐
mas around the “common sense” view that “a country
should look after its own citizens before they start look‐
ing after imports” (UM2). Here the participant failed to
realise that talking about “imports” is a dehumanizing
way to address the potential contributions—and com‐
plex humanitarian and other needs—of economic and
non‐economic immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees.
UF6 went further and imagined being able to close the
borders completely before realising she would need to
settle for something less than this fantasy:
I’d like the borders to always be shut off, but the real‐
istic approach would be just more control. Obviously
if you stay in the EU you’re not really going to be able
to control the European citizens coming in because
they’re allowed to.
Another participant suggested that while the referen‐
dum was still a year away, there was already a shared
sense of what leaving the EU would mean: “Yeah, yeah
cause then they can say ‘tatty bye’ to a lot of people,
shut the door and a lot more, then we might have some
jobs, we have some schools and classes that are not
overfull” (UF5). These overtly aggressive and dehuman‐
izing stances demonstrated not only a shamelessness
about leaving the EU in order to exclude a wide range
of migrants, but also devaluation of an awareness of the
shared basic concerns of people (e.g., to belong in and
contribute to a place) and the value of a global solidarity.
A further shame sub‐theme was the role of the EU
in allowing and even intentionally causing humiliation of
the British people. NM3 expressed anger about immi‐
gration and his powerlessness to do anything about it
through traditional political practices. He positioned “the
rest of Europe” as being happy that migrants were pre‐
ferring Britain over their countries, while also devaluing
voting as a means to be heard on the topic:
I don’t, I’m not going to vote. Europe is full of Eastern
Europeans coming here, they all want to come here
to use the NHS, take the jobs and the rest of Europe
doesn’t care, as it doesn’t concern them, they’re glad
they’re coming here and not there.” (NM3)
Europe and the EU were represented as agents that felt
positive about the control and power that they had over
the UK: “I mean we almost have to get permission every
time we want to do anything, change anything. Brussels
has to authorise it, well that’s ridiculous.” UF9 imagined
this trend continuing, especially if people voted to stay
in the EU:
It’ll be more of what we’ve got already. More immi‐
gration coming over, more people taking our jobs
that nothing will be Britain anymore. We’ll be classed
as the EU, we won’t be our own country, we can’t do
anything unless we you know have to ask the EU peo‐
ple first if we can do this, do changes and I think if
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we’re our own country we should be able to do and
change whatever we like.
The affective dilemma of a potential future shameful loss
of identity and control contrasted with the desire still
for a positive sense of self‐worth and even to return to
a previous position of power. Ostensibly eschewing an
anti‐European stance based on nationality and general
xenophobia, NM2 initially presented himself as open to
collaboration with the EU: “I’m not a great patriot, so
I’m not going to say ooh we don’t want to be mixed up
with Europeans.” However, he went on to express a fun‐
damental ambivalencewhichwas eventually captured by
a less open sense of “tolerance” and a stance consistent
with the phrase “Take back control”: “I don’t mind being
mixed up with Europeans, but I don’t want them dictat‐
ing to me how I should and shouldn’t live” (NM2).
6.2. Transvaluation, Nostalgia, and Change
Reactionist‐Style
The account presented thus far suggests that the details
of anti‐EU feelings are usually passed over and, if stated
in public conversation, are oriented to as something
that others will find unacceptable or intolerable. An indi‐
vidual neo‐liberal subjectivity that implies that we are
responsible for the circumstances that we live in is
deeply unpleasant to acknowledge: Blaming others can
be an attractive alternative because it presents an oppor‐
tunity to exercise a sense of agency and to look for
sources of positivity about one’s demeaned, devalued,
or humiliated identity. It is possible then to find exam‐
ples of Salmela and Capelos’s (2021) parallel processes
of transvaluation which were at different stages of being
“worked through”; namely, devaluation of values that
were previously regarded as important (e.g., community
values, equality, national unity). Devaluation of the UK
was evident in descriptions of the country as a “dumping
ground for everywhere else” (UM6), “I just don’t think
there’s anything to vote for anymore” (NF4), and “I just
think the whole system stinks, it’s rotten to the core.
Not just politics, everything in this country stinks” (NM2).
Arguably, freedom of movement was also devalued by
citizens when they were willing to sacrifice this for them‐
selves or for young people to limit immigration mostly,
but not exclusively, from Europe.
Reactionary “desire for change backwards” and
opposition to politicians trying to maintain the status
quo contrasted with calls for radical political change,
expressed by some participants as the need to “get rid of
the lot we’ve got” (NF4) and to “start again with a differ‐
ent type of people in politics” (NM2). Many non‐voters
were despondent about the possibilities of achieving
change through politics but were open to opportuni‐
ties such as the 2016 referendum; while many UKIP
voters felt that an anti‐establishment party might be
the best means to achieve the kind of change they
wanted. Explicit discussions of change appealed to a
widely shared view of a desirable past whichmany partic‐
ipants eventually connected with a need to leave the EU:
“There’s an awful lot of people who remember pre‐war,
like me, who feel very strongly that this isn’t a country
thatwe knowanymore” (UF2). Others described areas of
cities and places like East London as irrevocably changed:
“You go there and you don’t recognise the place anymore,
you feel like a foreigner in your own country” (UM9).
UM5 spoke about these changes with a mixture of nos‐
talgia and dismay:
When you get to my age you remember when you
lived in an area and everybody was in the same boat,
there was that community, if you like, you know, can
I borrow a cup of sugar from your neighbours, that
sort of thing. Now the gap is so huge between the
haves and have nots.
The connection between a retrospective focus and leav‐
ing the EU becomes clearer in statements from older par‐
ticipants who associated joining Europe with the begin‐
ning of a period of British decline:
Before wewere in Europe this country was getting on
its feet and it was in a good state after the war, and
we got in at a good time. Until we got into Europe
and we saw the decline start to start, and that’s the
reason I’d like to see us out of it. (UM4)
The sense of loss is also evident in a response to the
follow‐up question: “So for you, the things that are kind
of just gone downhill are linked to Europe rather than
the banking crisis?,” to which UM4 replied: “We’re quite
a clever race, and we’re quite good at what we do and
our manufacturing and all that” but also noted:
I mean we lost steelworks and stuff like that, our car
plants all gone. We used to produce the best cars in
the world, the steel was took all over the world and
it’s all gone now, and you know we’ve lost it all.
UM2 concurred: “I feel very strongly about being in the
EuropeanUnion, I think that it’s holding our country back
quite dramatically.”
Nostalgia about one’s nation implies a positive expe‐
rience of reflecting upon a time when things were better.
While some of the examples above suggest a collective
nostalgia, remembering what was good about the past
was felt as a loss in the present. The NHS, for exam‐
ple, was a subject of both nostalgia and concern to
many participants, but this does not appear to fit with a
reactionary account of populism except where fear and
anger about its decline could be traced to neglect by
UK politicians and a potential monetary benefit of leav‐
ing the EU. Moreover, while immigrants were praised for
their role in the NHS, many participants argued that ulti‐
mately the “way we are carrying on with the NHS, we
won’t have one anyway, not unless we get out of Europe
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we won’t” (UM4). The notion of an anti‐establishment
career (Kemmers et al., 2016) suggests that the resent‐
ful feelings of citizens combine with experiences of neg‐
atively changing life circumstances. Reacting angrily to
the pace of social change and feeling nostalgic about the
past are affects that sediment over time in a way that is
consistent with findings that support for populist views
increase with age.
In contrast, the seven participants in this study under
30 years old might be expected to be less likely to com‐
bine anti‐politics stances with a desire to change things
back to a previous, better time, when their community
or the country was perceived in more positive or even
“glowing” andmythologised terms. Family conversations
provided some participants with a sense of a better past
that had been sharedwith them as a younger generation.
As a result, UF9was clear about what needed to be done:
We should get out definitely, be our own country.
Whatweused to be. That’s all gone pear shaped since
we joined the EU. Years ago, my dad always told me
all the time, how things are so different and now he
doesn’t even recognise the country anymore. It’s not
what it was, not at all.
From an older person’s perspective, UM4 described feel‐
ing sorry for younger people as things get progressively
worse in the country: “‘Cause I feel sorry for the young‐
sters nowwho are going to have to put upwithwhat they
are going to get. And I think this world is on its way back‐
wards not forwards.” Somewhat confusingly, this partici‐
pant’s vision was more about going back, rather than for‐
ward towardsmore social change, because by leaving the
EUhe hoped that theUKwould begin to reverse the prob‐
lems caused by “into Europe”:
UM4: Things just haven’t worked, I mean they have
changed this country to something which is abso‐
lutely useless. I mean put it this way, it’s gone back
again. Before we went into Europe, this country was
really getting on its feet. I mean it took a long time
after the world war for things to get right and it
seemed to get more and more right and settled and
in a straight line if you get my meaning, we were on
a balance.
Desire for “backwards focused” change was also artic‐
ulated in the anticipated positive outcomes of leaving
the EU: “I think we’ll be a stronger country I think yeah
we’ll just be stronger and have more worldwide trade
and more English can work more jobs and hopefully get
the country back to what it used to be” (UF9). This sense
of getting the country “back to what it used to be” encap‐
sulates the sense of reactionary change, as contradictory
as this can sound, because it is not literally about restor‐
ing the past. Change backwards by leaving the EU would
also mean, “We’ll be back to being known as being Great
Britain, and the others [in the EU] aren’t great without
Britain. I think we’ll get our name back, definitely” (UF9).
UM5who said hewas against the EU “whenwe first went
into all this,” also remarked:
My thoughts haven’t changed. It goes back to we’re
an island andwe’re proud of being an island and inde‐
pendent, we don’t want to be ruled by the masses.
You knowwemanaged for hundreds of years without
that so let’s carry on.
Against a narrated background of loss of past national
strength, greatness, and previous collective coping abil‐
ities, several participants emphasised restoring national
sovereignty as a benefit of leaving the EU:
I think we should be an independent European coun‐
try away from Brussels. We shouldn’t let Europe dic‐
tate their rules to us when we’ve always been a force
to contend with you know, we are a world power, we
should just stay separate you know. (UM8).
In this situation, leaving the EU could refocus efforts
on making “Britain as good as it was, I don’t know,
40, 50 years ago, and we have declined, I think we’ve
become too reliant on other countries when we don’t
need to from an economic point of view” (UF10). They
imagined a reversal of the situation under the EU from
being dictated to—and therefore being humiliated as a
nation—to being able to dictate to others:
UM1: Yeah, currently, I don’t think it is British iden‐
tity, its more European and that’s one of the main
reasons I want to come out, ‘cause I want to revert to
back to being British and English, like you say erm and
at the moment I don’t believe we are, we’re sort of
being told by other countries what to do really, when
it should be the other way around.
The excerpt clearly catches the reactionary focus on
change backwards to a normal British‐first identity:
“Because then you’re British, you, you, you’re not
European, ‘Ah, you’re part of the EU,’ no you’re British
and that’s it. You go back towhat youwere, normal thing,
which is you’re British” (UF1 with imagined discussant in
single quotation marks). The example also shows how
this can be achieved through affective discursive prac‐
tices in which undiscussed shame and inferable humili‐
ation by the EU are replaced with a collective or hubris‐
tic pride based on superiority to, or desired dominance
over, others.
7. Conclusions
The ressentimentful account of a reactionary orientation
among supporters of populist ideas, parties, and move‐
ments is promising, but relatively untested. In this article,
the concept of reactionary affective practices was intro‐
duced to explore how affects or emotions such as anger,
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resentment, and fear combine with other emotions, and
change over time to become intense feelings towards
groups regarded as being opposed to one’s own inter‐
ests. Three additional features that have been identi‐
fied in the political psychology literaturewere addressed:
1) support for a combination of anti‐political stances
(e.g., against voting, or for UKIP and for leaving the EU
and being opposed to immigration), 2) a potential role
for economic shame‐repressing ressentiment, the ways
in which shame became attached to UKIP and anti‐EU
views primarily through the possibility of racism (rather
than simply being the product of a previously existing or
dormant racism as many people oriented towards this),
and 3) a focus on the affective complexity of reactionary
change backwards (i.e., that it is not a simple desire
to recreate the past, a feeling of collective nostalgia or
widespread collective narcissism).
On the first issue, the analysis of interviews with
English non‐voters and UKIP supporters showed the
importance of participating in ordinary activities of care‐
ful or limited sharing of grievances over time in form‐
ing the view not only that it would feel right to leave
the EU, but also sensed that many others in their com‐
munities shared these feelings. By examining the affec‐
tive practices of people around the time that the EU ref‐
erendum was announced, it was possible to show how
stronglymany already felt about immigration, elite politi‐
cians, and the EU as the agent primarily responsible for
social and political change, including the loss of indus‐
tries, a decline in post‐war prosperity, a humiliating cur‐
tailment of autonomy and independence, and a reduced
role on the world stage. The benefit of focusing on reac‐
tionary affective practices—rather than reactionism as
a discourse, general stance, or personality trait—was
that the “demand side” of support for the populist pol‐
icy of leaving the EU could be examined in the period
before the official start of the referendumcampaign (e.g.,
including attempts to link leaving the EU with saving
money that could be redirected towards “our NHS”).
Shame‐repression and long‐term ressentiment were
examined by looking for instances where anger was used
to cover (or condense) feelings of shame, or humilia‐
tion stemming from the neglect of UK politicians and
the imagined enjoyment of the UK’s predicament by
Europeans or the EU. While many people spoke of losses
and demonstrated suspicion that the right‐wing populist
anti‐immigration politics of their populist peers could be
criticised as racist, discriminatory, uncaring, and shame‐
ful; nevertheless extreme, aggressive, and dehumaniz‐
ing attitudes were presented in a defiant, shameless
manner. Some of these stances seemed unlikely to bear
much discussion or criticism (i.e., which might have
allowed shame to re‐experienced), or been described
in terms of the desire of the other to inflict humilia‐
tion. There was also evidence of the transvaluation of
previous values and identities, but the parallel process
of adopting a hopeful and potentially influential anti‐
EU stance was often experienced as a highly ambivalent
embodied affective dilemma, even though it might ulti‐
mately provide the means to restore pride in a British or
English identity.
Our conversations also revealed nostalgia for a rela‐
tively prosperous post‐war period that some participants
wanted to return to, and others felt could be achieved
again if the humiliating, controlling, and restricting role
of the EU could be done away with. These findings
extended Salmela and von Scheve’s (2017) analysis of the
repression of economic shame and showed how many
participants combined a felt need to leave the EU with
other anti‐political stances. Older relatives had shared
their memories with younger family members who had
experienced neither the beginning of the European
Market, nor Britain as a great country leading the world,
dictating to others, having less diversity, being “less full,”
and with an NHS system that was able to “look after
our own.”
The affective practices focus on everyday forms of
sedimentation shows potential to flesh out Cromby’s
(2019) Vygotskyan account of Brexit in terms of con‐
densed and internalized dialogical emotions as well
as the repetition of feelings of organisation over time
that eventually “come to include feelings of knowing
that leaving the EU is desirable” (Cromby, 2019, p. 65).
The analysis avoided pathologising people who sup‐
ported leaving the EU and any emphasis on “the gulli‐
bility of ordinary people as well as their xenophobia”
(Walkerdine, 2020, p. 144). Regarding shame repression
and ressentimentful affectivity, there was evidence of a
wide range of orientations towards the shame of being
against immigration, especially when enacted in a dehu‐
manising and aggressive manner. Further research on
the contribution of reactionary orientations to politi‐
cal populism should focus on: instances of transvalua‐
tion of previously shared values, ideals and identities,
deep ambivalence around humiliated and potentially
restorable British and English identities, defensive enact‐
ments of right‐wing aggressive and dehumanizing views,
connections with widely shared emotions in people’s
communities (e.g., widespread feelings of betrayal, etc.),
and experiences of collective pride or hubris.
As a final point, it is vital that further work uses
additional methods of rich data collection (e.g., ethnog‐
raphy, walk‐along interviews, video analysis) to explore
the variety of reactionary affective practices on both
the right and left of populist politics. Telephone inter‐
views should be supplemented by approaches that can
examine the patterns and flows of emotional activity
in the private and public lives, spaces and practices in
which participants and specialist groups (e.g., YellowVest
protestors, Alternative für Deutschland supporters) do
reactionary politics.
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